IMMIGRANTS: OLD DEMOCRACIES, NEW CHALLENGES

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Abstract
The phenomenon of migration has been part of human history since the beginning of time. Nowadays, however, it has become a greater challenge for states with an old history and culture, which opened their borders to receive masses of people persecuted because of extreme political or conflictual climax in their own countries.

Key Words: migration, globalization, multicultural, immigration.
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1. Introduction
Globalization is a complex phenomenon and includes a multitude of processes that address various areas of the society. (Zlatescu and Bucur-Ioan, 2019)

One of the most common definitions of this concept shows globalization as a process where geographical distances become less important in the establishment and development of international economic, political and socio-cultural relations.

Globalization is a multicultural phenomenon, which is the result of global events, having effects on societies no matter how close they are, geographically speaking, to the origins of the event. It refers to the movement of goods/services; the movement of mass of people (migration), capital and technology. The actual term of globalization has occurred in the end of the 60s and was launched by a Canadian specialist on the theory of mass communication means, Professor Marshall McLuhan at the University of Toronto and the American specialist in the problems of communism, Zbigniew Brzezinski from the Columbia University. The term of globalization has entered a dictionary on 1961. There are numerous definitions of this contemporary phenomenon in the literature. A process through which the world tends to become a single space, globalization is either contested (by the conservatives) or promoted with courage (by the Liberals) as a measure of universal prosperity, peace and freedom or treated as a danger (by critics). (McLuhan, 1995)

In the paper "The Security Strategy of the United States of America: A New Era" (2002), globalization is defined as a "process that speeds up economic, technological, cultural and political integration, along with democratic governance, market economy, respect for human rights, political dynamism and communications revolution". (America’s National Security Strategy, 2002) Defined in the same time as a process of extending, deepening and accelerating global interconnections, globalization became a space of changes that link business

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relations and human activities disregarding the barriers or distances between continents.

Globalization is thus a complex phenomenon, spread on several dimensions: politics, economy, environment, society, culture. One of the visible effects is the development of a worldwide trend to unify some very different cultures in huge socio-political areas. In this paper, we will try to look at this phenomenon and its implications on these dimensions with a special focus on international migration. We will assert that migration is one of the most significant aspects of globalization.

2. Old democracies, new challenges

After the end of the Cold War and the enlargement of the European Union, European public opinion had nourished the idea that globalization would hasten the decline of states as key actors on the international stage and of nationalism as an essential motivational factor on a political level. A fleeting glance at China, India and Russia, without mentioning the vast expanses of the Muslim world, clearly shows that both ethnic nationalism and religion remain major driving forces in global politics. Also visible in the context of the refugee crisis is the fact that national loyalties, once considered dead and buried, has returned – with full force - to contemporary Europe.

As a result of the massive new waves of immigrants, Europe’s identity crisis has deepened, and some of its Christian traditions, on which it has been built, were seriously threatened. This fact will probably transform a welcoming environment, characterized by tolerance and openness, into a climate dominated by dullness and aggression.

One can say that globalization has become a true religion of modern society. According to statistics, the number of immigrants has increased by 130% in the last three decades.

As an ideology of diversity, multiculturalism aims to provide an affirmative framework for group identities. C. W. Watson encompasses multiculturalism to the political and philosophical implications assumed by the coexistence of various modalities of human positioning in the world and the way in which different cultural entities struggle for recognition, both within the national state and in the global system. Multiculturalism seemed at one moment to respond to the needs of a changing world in which the expression of different identities takes the form of responses to the challenges brought in the same time by the national state, the transnational and global sphere. Thus, the process of globalization puts us in front of a continuous relocation of majority / minority relations, in concrete cultural spaces and on a global level, and urges us to a continuous understanding, acceptance and affirmation of diversity.

The strategic orientations of the legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom of security and justice for the period 2014-2020 emphasized the need for a global approach to migration. (Krastev, 2018)
The phenomenon of migration is not new at all, over the ages has had different effects on societies and cultures; it has merged civilizations (Ex: European civilizations with Eastern, African civilizations), discovered new worlds (the discovery of America), preceded the formation of nation states (Ex: exodus of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union after World War II or flows from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy to Northern Europe in the 1950s), created a "boomerang" (if we refer to the migration of colonized populations to European states).

The presence of immigrants inevitably generates elements of contrast and comparison in relation to indigenous populations. An immigrant Frenchman is a citizen of the Republic and enjoys all the legally defined constitutional rights, but is not considered a true Frenchman. This means that granting citizenship, obtaining a permanent job and a stable residence are not enough to define one's identity. Further, in Europe, unlike the USA or Australia, the identity is valued in terms of physical characteristics and, in particular, religion, nationality and culture. To be an American is, most of the times, sufficient to be a citizen. Being French, German or English cannot be acquired only through citizenship. Most European states were considered homogeneous natural states, whose members have the feeling of belonging to the national community due to unifying factors such as: common history, ethnic identity, language and culture.

Being part of the total movement of a population, migration is interested not only in demography, but also in sociology, which studies the phenomena of adaptation or acculturation of migrants, the influence of migration on the population structure, on social institutions, etc.

Following numerous terrorist attacks in recent years, opinion polls indicate that the majority of British, German and French citizens believe that humanity is heading for a major war, and that these external threats the EU is facing seem rather to divide rather than to unite. The need to respond effectively to the serious escalation of terrorist threats has forced European leaders to cooperate - more than ever in the past - in the field of security.

According to Eurostat, Europe is aging - the average age on the continent is expected to increase to 52.3 years in 2050, from 37.7 years in 2003 - and this is a threat to the future of European prosperity. Most Europeans believe that the lives of today's children will be more difficult than the lives of their generation.

The Convention on the Status of Refugees constitutes a multilateral UN treaty, which defines what a refugee is and outlines the rights of individuals granted asylum, as well as the responsibility of nations granting that asylum. Article 1 of the Convention, as amended by the 1967 protocol, defines a refugee as follows: “A person who, following justified fears of being persecuted due to harassment, religion, nationality, belonging to a social group or political opinions, is outside the country whose citizenship he has and who cannot or, because of this fear, does not want the protection of this country; or having no citizenship and staying outside the country; or who had his habitual residence as a result of such events, cannot or, due
to that fear, does not wish to return." (PROTOCOL relating to the status of refugees, 1967)

In this context, the current crisis of immigration in the E.U and the failure of the Refugee Convention to manage it effectively serve as a turning point in reshaping the present world. What until yesterday was regarded as a world order that emerged after the Cold War now increasingly resembles a second decolonization. But if the first round of decolonization meant the return home of the colonizers, the second phase, the decolonization of today, coincides with the migration of the "colonized" into the metropolis. Half a century ago, colonies evoked, as an argument for their liberation, the promise of Europeans to grant them the right of self-government; now, he invokes the protection of human rights to defend his right to be received in Europe.

In the 21st century, migration may represent a new type of revolution - a revolution of individuals and families, driven by the idea of leaving their native places. To succeed, this new revolution does not need an ideology, nor political movements or political leaders. For many of the people on this earth, crossing the border of the European Union is a matter of human necessity and by no means a question of fulfilling a utopian future.

In today's connected world, this new revolution may be inspired not by the ideologically projected images of bright future worlds, but by real Google Maps and photos of life on the other side of the border. Migrants are far from being the "virtual vanguard of huge masses of people," as some radical theorists like Alain Badiou have described, but rather quite lonely revolutionaries. (Krastev, 2018) Migrants do not write (or read) manifestos - communist or of any other orientation. To succeed, this new revolution does not need a coherent ideology, a political movement or leadership. A simple crossing of the European Union border is more appealing than any utopia. For so many of the so-called damnés de la terre (Fr. Damned of the earth), change means changing your country by leaving, not changing your government, sitting still.

The refugee crisis has dramatically changed the concept of democratic politics at national level and what we see in Europe today is not just a populist rebellion against the establishment, but also a rebellion of those with the right to vote against leaders and decision-makers (best symbolized by officials) from Brussels, which seem to have lost contact with the ones they are supposed to represent and serve.

This crisis has fundamentally changed the state of affairs in Europe. It cannot be explained only by the influx of refugees or migrants into the labor market. It is, among many other things, a migration of arguments, emotions, political identities and votes. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall - a landmark event for the opening of a world - Europe has begun to build, hundreds of kilometers of fences, expressly meant to keep out others.

For many, the European Union represented a nucleus of stability and that humanity will progress and develop in the direction of a more democratic and
tolerant society. In an ideological context also determined by liberal formulas regarding the progress of mankind, the refugee crisis requires the reconsideration of all the values from the peak to the base. The migration crisis brings us to the situation where we have to completely rethink the way of managing the new situations and to take into account new challenges, quite different from those that emerged after the fall of the communist bloc, in 1989.

The fact that so many Europeans unconditionally accept the idea that the flow of immigrants is a sign of the failure of democracy is symptomatic of the problems on the agenda. Only a radical rethink of the unintended consequences of the end of the Cold War could explain why various angry populists were dangerously fast gaining ground throughout the Western world and why liberal notions of tolerance are derisively reduced to the caricature idea of political correctness and came to be regarded as threats to societies. Not necessarily the ideas, but rather the millions of people who arrive today legally or illegally in the European Union are the ones who will influence the European history of the 21st century. Migrants, in other words, are the actors of history that will define the fate of European liberalism. But the central role of the migration crisis in European politics compels us not only to reimagine the future, but to reinterpret the past.

Jowitt predicted that in a world full of connectivity, but marked by economic, political and cultural disparities, we must be prepared for the outbursts of anger and the emergence of "anger movements" that will emerge from the ashes of weakened national states. (Jowitt, 1991)

This transition from the unconnected world of the 1990s to the world of emergent barricades today is what is changing the performative role of democratic regimes. Democracy, as a type of regime that favors the emancipation of minorities (gay parades, women's marches, positive discrimination policies) is in danger to be replaced by a political regime that may legitimize the biases of a majority of citizens. And the political shock caused by the flow of refugees and migrants becomes the driving force of this transformation. A study conducted by the Demos think tank in London, long before Brexit and Donald Trump's victory in the presidential election, shows that opposition to liberal migration policies is a defining feature of those who support the right-wing populist parties. (Krastev, 2018)

The failure of liberalism to solve the problem of migration, and not necessarily the economic crisis or growing social inequality, could explain the return of public opinion against the existing system. The inability and refusal of liberal elites to discuss migration and deal with its consequences, on the one hand, and the insistence that existing policies always lead to a positive amount (a win-win situation), on the other for so many people, liberalism is synonymous with hypocrisy. This revolt against the hypocrisy of the liberal elites fundamentally influences the political landscape of Europe.

Just as the free movement of ideas contributed to the burial of communism (and, with it, the Cold War), so did the free movement of people who crossed the
EU and US borders, burying the order established after the Cold War. The refugee crisis has revealed the futility of the Cold War paradigm and, in particular, the inability of institutions and regulations during the Cold War to solve the problems of the contemporary world. The 1951 Convention on Refugees is among the most eloquent examples of this failure.

Despite the many differences between the respective political contexts, the present moment has similarities with the popular uprisings of the 1960s. Most worried that foreigners would take over their countries and endanger their way of life, being convinced that the current crisis was induced by a conspiracy between the cosmopolitan-minded elites and the tribal-minded immigrants.

In many ways, those who vote for the far right in Europe today have the same feelings as those French pieds-noirs, who were forced to leave Algeria during the Independence War.

A decade ago, Gaspar Miklos Tamas, a Hungarian philosopher and former dissident, observed that the Enlightenment, in which the idea of the European Union finds its intellectual roots, was calling for universal citizenship. But universal citizenship presupposes the existence of several premises: either that people enjoy absolute freedom of movement, in search of jobs and higher standards of living, or that the huge economic and political disparities between countries disappear, allowing people to enjoy their universal rights, equally anywhere in the world. But none of these conditions will happen too soon or maybe never.

The migration crisis brings a contradiction in front of liberalism, which is fundamental to its philosophy. How can our universal rights be in close accordance with the fact that we are exercising them as citizens of unequal societies in terms of freedom and prosperity? Globalization has made the world a village, but this village lives in a kind of dictatorship - a dictatorship of global comparisons. It is not unusual rare for people to compare their way of living with the one of their neighbors; furthermore, they are now comparing themselves to the most prosperous inhabitants on the planet. Raymond Aron was right when he remarked, five decades ago, that "once humanity started on the path to unification, the inequality between peoples gained the significance that inequality between (social) classes once had. (The Dawn of Universal History..., 1961)

For Zizek, the reaction of public opinion and authorities in Western Europe to the flow of refugees from Africa and the Middle East is subject to a similar combination of divergent reactions. It compares the reactions to the migration crisis with the stage reaction a man has to an illness, as described by Elisabeth Kubler-Rotss in her book On Death and Dying.

There was denial: "It's not too serious, let's just ignore the situation." There is anger: "Refugees are a threat to our way of life, with Muslim fundamentalists hiding among them, they must be stopped at any cost."There is negotiation: "Okay, let's set quotas and organize refugee camps in the respective countries. "There is depression:" We are lost; Europe turns into Europastan! "What is missing from his vision it is acceptance, which, in this case, would have meant a coherent pan-
European plan to tackle the refugee problem. The contradiction between the universal character of human rights and the effective exercise of the law in a national context was at the center of the current crisis of the political left, caused by the flow of refugees.

During the refugee crisis, the debate on refugees and migrants was transformed from a discussion of rights and economics, into a discourse on security. Governments and populations likewise claim that their moral responsibility cannot be disassociated with their ability to provide assistance and the risks that newcomers present to their societies.

Thus, the migration crisis not only altered the left-right balance in European politics and undermined the liberal consensus that ruled Europe for decades in a row, but provoked such a crisis of political identity both on the left and on the right of the political chessboard, at the same time overturning the arguments that the European Union has used to justify its existence. Europe no longer behaves as a model of the world to come. The European Union is now being promoted, at least by a number of its supporters, as the last hope of a continent-fortress.

In the 1990s, globalization meant opening borders for ideas, goods and capital, being hailed as a force for the democratization of the world. Things are not the same now. Since 1994, Edward Luttwak has warned that the spread of world capitalism could spark the return to fascism.

Tolerance and kindness have long been the hallmarks of the European Union. Today, they are often perceived as intrinsic vulnerabilities of the Union. Paradoxically, a revolt against tolerance is frequently encountered by both populists and liberals: while the populists claim that their societies become "brown", being polluted by laughter, non-white cultures and religions, and that Europe cannot or does not want to defend their values, liberals are also afraid that societies will become "brown", but in the sense that an increasing number of people share the ideology of the national-socialist brown shirts of Germany.

In this regard, a major impact of the refugee crisis on European policy is the moral panic that has caused the impression that the situation has been out of control. The countless gestures of goodwill towards refugees from the war and persecution in Middle East or North Africa, which we saw in 2015, in places like Germany or Austria, are today overshadowed by their reverse: overwhelming anxiety at the thought that the same strangers, warmly welcomed back with one year they will compromise Europe's well-being model and historical culture, and will destroy our liberal societies. Fear of Islamic terrorism and a general anxiety about the unfamiliar are intrinsic moral panic in Europe. In January 2017, the YouGov poll firm found that 81% of the French, 68% of the British and 60% of the Germans expected a major terrorist attack to take place in their country within the next year. The prospect of a future in which the borders of the European Union are permanently assaulted by refugees or migrants erodes the confidence that Europeans have given to their political system.
It is difficult for me to understand why the nations whose citizens were once politically oppressed and who felt what solidarity means now end up withdrawing their solidarity with oppressed people from other places, German President Joachim Gauck said at one point. How can one explain why the people of Central Europe who have come to break away from the fundamental values that underlie the European Union and show so little solidarity with the sufferings of others?

Scandalous in the behavior of the East Europeans, from the point of view of the West, it is not the fact that they want to build fences to stop the access of refugees, but the conception that "we have no obligation to these people."

Eastern Europe's hostility towards refugees, though shocking to many, should not surprise us; it has its roots in the history, demography and complicated paradoxes of the post-communist transition, while also representing the central European variant of a popular uprising against globalization.

If in the pre-war period Poland was a multiethnic and multi-confessional society, in which over a third of the population was made up of Germans, Ukrainians and Jews, today Poland is ethnically one of the most homogeneous societies in the world, with 98% from the Polish ethnic population. For many of them, the return to ethnic diversity means a return to the troubled times of the period between the two World Wars. After all, the destruction and expulsion of the Jewish and German communities were actions that facilitated the formation of middle classes in Central Europe. And if the European Union is based on the idea of nation, taken from the French (in which membership is defined as loyalty to the institutions of the republic), and on the state idea, taken from the Germans (strong lands and a relatively weak federal center), Instead, the Central European states were built on a reverse structure: they combined the admiration of the French for the centralized and all-powerful state with the idea that citizenship implies a common descent and a culture shared by all, as the Germans claim. In the view of French political scientist Jacques Rupnik, residents of central Europe were particularly outraged by criticism of Germany during their refugee crisis. And this is because the idea of the nation as a cultural unit took it exactly from the Germans of the 19th century.

But Central Europe's resentment towards contemporary refugees is rooted not only in its long history, but also in the experiences of the post-communist transition. What followed after communism and the launch of liberal reforms was widespread cynicism. It can be said that Central Europe leads the world in matters of distrust of public institutions. Brecht is no longer included in the school curriculum, but most Eastern Europeans still subscribe to his idea - "for this world we live in, none of us is bad enough." Faced with a wave of migrants and tortured by the idea of economic insecurity, many East Europeans feel betrayed in their hope that, by joining the European Union, they will soon reach prosperity and escape the worries of a crisis-filled existence. Being poorer than Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans wonder how anyone can claim to show spontaneous human solidarity. Frankly, the East European response to globalization is not much different from that of Trump
supporters from the white working class. And some, and others, were considered unjust losers.

The hostile reaction of East Europeans towards refugees and migrants is also rooted in a sense of betrayal that many have when they hear European leaders talking about mass migration as a solution in which everyone they have to win. In his book "Exodus", Paul Collier, an economist from Oxford, makes it clear that if population migration from poorer countries to the West is beneficial to migrants and as a whole disadvantages host societies, on the other hand, this can negatively affect the lower classes of the same host societies and, in particular, the chance that their children will have a better life in the future.

The unsuccessful integration of the Roma also contributes to the lack of compassion of Eastern Europe. If Eastern Europeans are afraid of foreigners it is because they do not trust the ability of society and their state to integrate the "others" already in their midst. Roma would be one of the most disturbing stories in contemporary Europe.

The failure of Roma integration is what causes Eastern Europeans to assume that their countries simply cannot do that. And the fact that Eastern Europeans and refugees, coming from Asia or the Middle East, very often come to compete in the Western labor markets does not have to cause East Europeans to be more open to integration policy of foreigners. On the contrary, in Central Europe, anti-Roma sentiments pushed the majority to turn against the rhetoric of human rights.

The paradox of the East-West split caused by the refugee crisis causes us to witness a convergence of attitudes in the sense that the Germans, who at one point have become friendly with refugees, are beginning to resemble xenophobic Hungarians. Moreover, the fact that many Germans have received refugees personally makes it easier for them, from a moral point of view, to turn now against the presence of foreigners in their country at the moment. But convergence of attitudes does not automatically lead to greater cohesion on the continent. The paradox of antithetic convergence is that the renationalization of politics makes a lot of Eastern Europeans, more than ever, feel like foreigners in Western Europe. As a result of the Brexit, attacks on Eastern Europeans have risen sharply in the UK.

Conclusions

Obviously, the continued mobility of people involves opportunities and challenges. In the age of globalization, it is essential to understand and respect the cultural differences between peoples and nations. Although racist theories have collapsed, there are some behaviors from ignorance to segregation and violence, as racial, ethnic or national confrontations persist in a world of globalization.

The refugee crisis is crucial for assessing the chances of survival of the European Union, as it simultaneously strengthens a sense of national solidarity and erodes the chance of constitutional patriotism in the Union as a whole. Therefore, the crisis represents a turning point in the political dynamics of the European
project. At the same time, the refugee crisis points to a time when the demand for democracy in Europe has been transformed into a call to defend one’s political community and thus a demand for exclusion rather than inclusion.

It is right to think about whether the former colonies are entitled to adopt populist and nationalist policies and whether the governments of these states are entitled to deny the right to free movement of people or to display a hostile attitude towards the population they once invaded.

In this case, it remains to be seen whether the European Union and the states with a democratic tradition will be able to manage the migration crisis, implicitly respecting human rights if they are to face the challenges that globalization and multiculturalism imply.

Bibliography